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), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in 
the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. 
allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, 
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cohesive society. 
Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving 
state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: 
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and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all 
transformed the way migrants interact with their home country. 
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countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that 
operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive 
cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights). 
INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU 
member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in 
origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective 
contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in 
their way? 
A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in 
the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of 
migrants in the host country remains to be done. 
 
INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by 
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Abstract 
This report investigates the integration of Turkish and Iranian immigrants in Sweden. The analytical 
focus is placed on the complex net of ties between institutional actors’ belonging to destination 
country and to the country of origin, paying special attention to the role played by the latter, what will 
be labelled as the “origin effect”. The overall scenario of integration emerging from the analysis 
appears tangled and complex: both groups show high naturalization rates, but they present significant 
difficulties as regards inclusion in the labour market and in the educational context. Looking “at 
origin” allows for identifying crucial element to fully understand these evidences and respective 
integration processes. Despite the complexity to provide a plain picture of the origin effect – which for 
each group is ambivalent and strictly related to the actors involved, to the relations among them, and 
to the migratory historic profile – this corridor report offers new and interesting insights for the study 
of immigrant integration. 
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1. Introduction  
This corridor report is a publication of the INTERACT Project, co-financed by the European Union 
and implemented by the European University Institute. The project aims to study the integration of 
third-country nationals as a three-way process involving immigrants, the countries of emigration, and 
the countries of immigration as actors of integration. The reference to integration as a ‘three-way 
process’ reflects the European Commission’s departure from a vision of integration as a strictly two-
way process. The Commission now acknowledges that countries of origin can also play a role in 
supporting the integration process (European Commission 2011a and 2011b). 
Concretely, the INTERACT project looks into ways that governments and non-governmental 
institutions in origin countries make transnational bonds a reality. The central context of the project is 
the changing global environment in which migration to the EU takes place. At present, migrants are 
people who face the challenge of integration while constantly communicating with their networks 
back home (and around the world). They come from diverse places with which they often stay in touch 
on daily basis.  
Following the logic of the research design, the relatively recent development of active diaspora and 
emigration policies in many countries of the world is central to our analysis. In addition, the impact of 
non-state actors which deal with migrants on the implementation of these policies and on their 
integration in the EU has not yet been studied. 
By a corridor, we mean a pair of countries: one origin and one destination. The corridors have been 
chosen to allow for cross-country comparison, both at the destination and origin. The proposed 
approach allowed the comparison of different corridors that share either a common origin or 
destination, and with it, an analysis of the impact of the countries of origin on integration at various 
destinations as well as a comparison of various migrant communities at the same destination. The aim 
is to disentangle and further hypothesise the role of the communities of origin and its variations 
according to destination. 
Sweden is an important immigration country in the European Union; it is one of the main 
destinations for migrants, especially refugees. Since new rules on labour migration came into force in 
2008, Sweden’s migration policy has been recognized as among the most open and liberal of OECD 
countries. At the same time, immigrant integration problems keep recurring; the 2013 riots in the 
suburbs of Stockholm are a recent example.  
The current report addresses these matters and the issue of immigrant integration more generally, 
focusing on specific immigrant groups, namely Turks and Iranians. These are two of the most 
prominent non-EU foreign communities in the country, which represent two different migratory 
realities at various levels. At destination, different policies apply as Turks come mainly as immigrant 
workers or family members of workers and Iranians as refugees. Significant differences also appear at 
origin. Turkey is a close EU ally, with a history of EU ties and the will to become a new EU member. 
The same cannot be said of Iran, which has never been a close EU partner, and whose politics 
targeting expatriates appear to clash with the Swedish integration framework.  
In this report we will analyse the differences and similarities between the two immigrants groups at 
destination, as well as between the two countries of origin in order to investigate their respective 
processes of integration and integration outcomes. To what extent do Swedish policies on immigrant 
integration and the emigrant policies pursued by governments and non-state actors from Iran and 
Turkey complement or contradict each other? What effective contributions do they make to the 
successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way? To answer these 
questions we rely on a data triangulation method of data collection and analysis (see next section on 
Methodology. 
Francesco Pasetti 
8 INTERACT RR2015/04 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section illustrates the methodology underlying the 
report and the INTERACT Project more generally. Then a general overview of migration trends from 
Turkey and Iran to Sweden is given, in order to show similarities and differences between the two 
groups. Section “4” examines the integration policies established at destination, and the emigration 
and diaspora policies in the sending countries. Then, relying on synthetic indexes, we provide a 
quantitative assessment of the integration trends of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden. These 
results are addressed in the following section, which offers some explanation grounded in data 
gathered from the project. Lastly, the report provides concluding remarks about the effect of the 
country of origin, which has been labelled “the origin effect”. 
2. Methodology 
The report is based on three different data sources (data triangulation): an analysis of the legal and 
political frameworks; a quantitative analysis; and a survey. 
The analysis of the legal and analytical frameworks was divided by country of origin and 
destination. In the countries of destination (EU28) we analysed the integration policy framework; in 
the countries of origin (55 non-EU countries) we analysed emigration and diaspora policy frameworks. 
The main questions asked concerned main stakeholders, policy actors, policy discourses, and legal 
frameworks. For the quantitative analysis we use a synthetic index of integration developed in Di 
Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015). It allows a comparison of the level of integration of 
migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration corridor To this end, a set of 
integration indicators were identified for each dimension, drawing on relevant national datasets. Using 
the Principal Component Analysis technique, the number of such indicators was reduced and replaced 
with a smaller number of new variables. These new variables (principal components) explain the 
maximum amount of variation among the performances of different immigration corridors, 
considering the three domains separately. On this basis, a synthetic index that allows the ranking of the 
immigrant corridors within each dimension was created. The main indicators building up the main 
three indexes were: 
Labour market integration index 
• Employment rate 
• Unemployment rate 
• Activity rate 
• Over-qualification rate 
Education integration index  
• Highest educational attainment 
• School enrolment rate at age 15-25  
• School enrolment rate at age 25-35 
• % of international students at age 20-24 
Citizenship integration index  
• Citizenship acquisition rate 
• % of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data) 
The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The 
higher the rank, the better the integration. In the corridor reports, the index is calculated without taking 
into account the gap between migrants and natives. It should be interpreted whereby the higher the 
Corridor Report on Sweden – The case of Iranian and Turkish immigrants 
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index, the better the performance of that corridor compared to the other corridors (Di Bartolomeo et al. 
2015).  
The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and 
September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU 
countries of destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the 
EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, 
education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, 
housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration 
dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into 28 languages and 
over 900 responses were collected online and over the phone. Although the exploratory character of 
the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society 
organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities impact migrant integration between the 
origin and destination. However, the survey does much more than just map these activities in the 
comparative context. It also shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the 
context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In this report, 
only information pertaining to Turkish and Iranian immigrants in Sweden is presented.
1
 
A final caveat should be made regarding the constraints of data availability. According to the 
policy of the Swedish national institute of statistics, statistical data accessible outside the country (free 
of charge) represents a very limited portion of the whole dataset; the majority of accessible data is 
available only at an aggregated level. For this reason, in order to offer a richer analysis of Iranian and 
Turkish communities in Sweden, this report has relied on other sources of data (i.e. the Migration 
Board, or Migrationsverket) and on specific literature focused on such communities. In addition, it is 
important to take into consideration the fact that the Swedish census only considers specific 
dimensions, namely: country of birth, citizenship and parents’ citizenship. This makes it very 
problematic to identify different ethnic/national groups within each community of origin. For instance, 
within the Turkish community it is not possible to discern between Turks, Kurds, and Syrians 
(Fredlund-Blomst 2014), even if we know from the literature (Westin 2003) that the Turkish 
community in Sweden is equally distributed among these ethnicities. The same problem goes for 
Iranians. Unfortunately, in this case the literature is not a great help, with most of the studies focusing 
on Iranians with Muslim backgrounds and leaving other ethnic and religious minorities essentially 
overlooked (Kelly 2011).  
3. Immigration trends of people born in Iran and Turkey to Sweden 
3.1 Immigration history of Iranians and Turks into Sweden 
Sweden’s modern era of immigration began after the Second World War, and can be described as 
divided into two distinct periods: the first characterized primarily by labour-force immigration and the 
second marked by a shift towards refugee and family migration (Bevelander 2004). The former lasted 
from 1945 to the first half of the 1970s. During this period two different migration trends alternated, 
both pushed by the expansion of the Swedish economy and the flourishing of its industry: one 
comprised of skilled migrants coming mainly from Germany and the Nordic countries (during the 
1950s), and another of unskilled and low-skilled workers coming from Southern European countries 
such as Greece and Yugoslavia (during the 1960s) (Envall 2012). In those days, in addition to the 
foreign labour recruited by major industrial companies, an increasing number of migrant jobseekers 
started to come to Sweden of their own accord. In order to meet labour demand, Sweden did not set up 
a guest worker program as other countries did, but instead opted for a policy of permanent 
                                                     
1
 For more information, please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report. 
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immigration that treated labour migrants like future citizens. This was one of the main results of the 
cooperation between the government and the trade unions confederation, which agreed that importing 
cheap labour would not be allowed (Roth and Hertzberg 2010). All of this changed when labour 
migration was stopped at the end of 1960s. Due to the economic downturn and increased 
unemployment, the demand for foreign labour declined and migrant worker inflows dropped 
significantly. Furthermore, the government, pushed by critics, changed the rule governing entrance 
into Sweden.  




Source: Sweden Statistics, Population statistics.  
The new rules began to apply in 1968 and meant that future work and residence-permit applicants 
from non-Nordic countries had to apply before they entered the country, while at the same time 
arranging for both a job and a place to live. This dramatically reduced labour immigration from non-
Nordic countries in the following decades (Bevelander 2004: 7).  
The beginning of the 1970s marks the start of a new era of immigration in Sweden. The drastic 
reduction of labour inflows was offset by an increase of refugees and family migration which 
characterized the second phase modern immigration. These new groups of immigrants were 
predominantly tied movers and various categories of refugees, and included a greater share of non-
European immigrants with migration motives other than work (Bevelander 2004: 8). 
Iranian immigration began at end of the 1970s. Until then, there were very few Iranians in Sweden. 
Most were students who generally planned to return to Iran following their graduation (Kelly 2011). 
Things changed drastically with the 1979 revolution and then later with the Iran-Iraq war, which led to 
a large exodus of people. This happened at the same time that traditional destination countries (i.e. the 
United States, France and the United Kingdom) became increasingly closed to migration inflows, 
which led Iranian migrants to direct their attention toward Northern Europe and, in particular, toward 
Sweden (Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly 2012). As already mentioned, the beginning of the second 
phase of the immigration process in Sweden was characterized by a rapid increase in asylum 
applicants: from about 3,000 in 1983 to more than 30,000 in 1989. Of these, the great majority had 
Iranian citizenship: between 1978 and 1991 more than 23,000 Iranian asylum seekers received legal 
refugee status in Sweden (Almqvist and Hwang 1999). Many of them had been part of the leftist 
                                                     
2
 In Figure 1, taken from Bevelander (2004: 7), immigration is defined as the number of foreign-born people 
migrating to Sweden. Unless otherwise specified in this report, immigrants are identified as foreign-born 
people.  
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opposition at the time of the revolution and found the Swedish socialist model appealing (Hosseini-
Kaladjahi 1997). Some had suffered persecution by the Iranian regime and had very strong reasons for 
applying for asylum; others sought asylum in order to preserve their pre-revolutionary lifestyles or to 
protect their children (Kelly 2013). 
Immigration coming from Turkey followed a different path. It began in the late 1960s with inflows 
of male labour, pushed by difficult economic situations and high unemployment in Turkey as well as 
drawn by job opportunities and a flourishing economy in Sweden. Back then, Turkish migrants were a 
small foreign community in the country, who came primarily from the districts of Konya and Kulu; a 
few also came from the Istanbul region (Bayram et al. 2009). Although there were some city-born 
skilled workers among early emigrants, most were rural-born unskilled workers who had first migrated 
to large cities and then moved to Western Europe (Karci Korfali et al. 2014). Such migration flows 
were framed within the institutional framework established by the Turkish government in its First 
Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967), which delineated the “export of surplus labour power” as a 
component of development policy to support prospective flows of remittances and reductions in 
unemployment (Icduygu 2008). With the same aim, Turkey signed bilateral agreements on labour 
recruitment with Western European countries, including: Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, Germany 
and Sweden (the latter in 1967).  
Notwithstanding the original intention of the policymakers, Turkish immigrants admitted on guest-
workers schemes settled permanently in western host countries by acquiring permanent resident (and 
in some cases citizenship status). This was even more the case in Sweden, which unlike other 
countries, opted for a policy of permanent immigration. Thus, despite the closing of western borders 
that followed the oil crisis, the Turkish community abroad continued to increase due to family 
reunification and the admission of asylum seekers as refugees, which became the two dominant forms 
of entrance into the country. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the channel of admission under 
refugee status was used predominantly by the Kurdish population, who sought political refuge in 
Sweden as well as in other European countries, after the insurgency for Kurdish rights was launched in 
the early 1980s.  
3.2 Comparative statistical figures on Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden 
As of 31 December 2013, foreign-born residents in Sweden numbered 1,533,493, representing 15.9% 
of the total population.
3
 Two-thirds came from non-EU countries, primarily from Iraq, Iran, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
The once-dominant Scandinavians, who composed well over half of Sweden’s foreign-born 
population in 1960, makes up only one-sixth of it today.  
                                                     
3
 Including people born in Sweden whose parents were born abroad, the overall number of people with a 
“foreign background” exceeds 2 million, which is equal to 20% of the total population. 
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Table 1. Top 10 foreign groups, 2013  
(Foreign-born residents and percentage of the immigrant population) 
# Country of origin Total Percentage 
1 Finland 161,129 10.5% 
2 Iraq 128,946 8.4% 
3 Poland 78,175 5.1% 
4 Iran 67,211 4.4% 
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 56,804 3.7% 
6 Somalia 54,221 3.5% 
7 Germany 48,987 3.2% 
8 Turkey 45,676 3.0% 
9 Denmark 43,198 2.8% 
10 Norway 42,523 2.8% 
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration.  
Taken together, Iranian and Turkish communities represent more than 7% of the immigrant population 
living in Sweden: the former constitutes the fourth largest foreign community, with 67,211 
individuals, whereas the latter is made up of 45,676 people born in Turkey, ranking at 8
th
 place.  
Iranian and Turkish immigrants have followed different migration paths, both in terms of 
distribution over time (Figure 2), as well as the different channels of entrance that they have chosen 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 2. Foreign-born people in Sweden: Iranian vs. Turkish 
 
* For 1975, foreign-born people were considered the number of aliens with 
certificates of registration plus the number of aliens with residence permits. 
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration. 
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Figure 3. Residence permits granted during the period 1980-2012: Iranian vs. Turkish 
 
Source: Migrationsverket data, own elaboration.  
On the one hand, Turkish immigration has changed considerably with regard to forms of entry and 
immigrant status in Europe, shifting from labour migration to family migration and political exile as 
asylum seekers. On the other hand, Iranian immigration has continued to be comprised primarily of 
refugees and family migrants who are middle-class and highly educated. As pointed out by the 
literature, this is related to: i) crucial events that characterize the history of each country, ii) the micro 
and macro characteristics of these populations, and iii) the specific politico-institutional structures 
within which their migrations took place (Bayram et al. 2009; Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly 2012; 
Kelly 2013; Westin 2006). 
The groups considered present similar age distributions, with the great majority of both communities 
concentrated in the range of 25-54 years old, very small percentages of children from 0 to 14 years old 
(around 3% for both Iranian and Turkish foreign-born persons) and a small percentage of elderly, older 
than 65 years (equal, respectively, to 7.8% for Iranians and 8.7% for Turks) (Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Share of immigrants according to their age group in 2013: Iranian vs. Turkish 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration. 
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The relationship between the male and female populations is also similar between the two 
communities, with a slight majority of men: 52.4% for Iranian immigrants and 55.2% for Turkish. 
This relationship has remained constant over the last ten years, with a small decrease in the proportion 
of Turkish women (Table 2).  
Table 2. Share of immigrants according to their gender, 2004-2013: Iranian vs. Turkish 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Iranian 
immigrants 
M 53.4% 53.3% 53.1% 53.0% 52.9% 52.7% 52.6% 52.6% 52.4% 52.4% 
W 46.6% 46.7% 46.9% 47.0% 47.1% 47.3% 47.4% 47.4% 47.6% 47.6% 
Turkish 
immigrants 
M 52.9% 53.1% 53.2% 53.5% 53.9% 54.2% 54.8% 55.1% 55.2% 55.2% 
W 47.1% 46.9% 46.8% 46.5% 46.1% 45.8% 45.2% 44.9% 44.8% 44.8% 
Note: M = Men; W = Women 
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration. 
The age distribution between genders approximately follows general patterns for both communities, 
with the great majority of men and women concentrated in the range of 25-54 years old (Table 3). 
From a historical perspective, the first inflows were predominately men. Then since the 1990s, the 
balance between men and women equalled out, mostly as a result of family reunifications (Karci 
Korfali et al. 2014).  
Table 3. Share of immigrant men and women according to their age group in 2013:  
Iranian vs. Turkish 
    0 to 14  15 to 24  25 to 34  35 to 44  45 to 54  55 to 64  65 or +  Tot. 
Iranian 
immigrants 
M 2.9% 5.5% 23.9% 15.7% 25.9% 18.7% 7.4% 100% 
W 3.1% 5.3% 26.0% 20.2% 23.0% 14.1% 8.2% 100% 
Turkish 
immigrants 
M 3.0% 7.2% 24.4% 24.3% 20.6% 12.8% 7.7% 100% 
W 3.2% 7.7% 20.7% 24.7% 21.7% 12.2% 9.9% 100% 
Note: M = Men; W = Women 
Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration. 
4. Institutional and policy framework4 
4.1 Institutional and policy framework of integration policies in Sweden 
Sweden has faced immigration issues since the end of World War II. The attitude of policymakers has 
changed over time as well, as immigration measures were established according to the evolution of the 
phenomenon; in particular, during the shift from labour immigration (up until the early 1970s) to 
refugee and tied immigration (from the 1970s onward). Until the early 1970s there was no proper 
migration policy, as such; legislators’ main concerns were to fill the labour shortages that 
characterized the domestic market (Bevelander 2004); to that end, specific actions were put in force, 
such as the development of immigration offices and the strengthening of Swedish-language education 
for foreign-born people. It is only in the mid 1970s that comprehensive migration policies were issued, 
inspired by principles of pluralism and equality between immigrants and the native population. In 
those days, policymakers were focused on labour market integration (given the need to cope with 
growing unemployment among foreigners) and refugee management, especially as regards residential 
integration (to this end a dispersion housing policy was introduced in 1985). For a specific policy 
                                                     
4
 This section relies on the information provided by Andersson and Weinar (2014) on Sweden, along with two 
internal INTERACT reports on Turkey and Iran. 
Corridor Report on Sweden – The case of Iranian and Turkish immigrants 
INTERACT RR2015/04 15 
addressing integration, we have to wait until the creation of the Integration Board in 1998. In line with 
Swedish legislative tradition the Integration Board pursued the equality between foreigners and natives 
according to an understanding of integration as a mutual process of adaptation between the host 
society and incoming immigrants and it inaugurated a concrete area of policymaking which assumed 
increasing relevance within the governance of migration.  
In the current political agenda, integration represents a critical issue. This is linked to several 
interrelated reasons, such as: i) the urban riots of May 2013, which took place across several 
Stockholm suburbs with the participation of many immigrant-origin youths and an intense media 
coverage that strongly impacted public opinion about immigration; and ii) the recent decision of 
Swedish government to grant a permanent residence permit to all Syrians arriving in the country, 
which in turn, raised issues about refugee management and burden-sharing among municipalities. 
These events occurred in a parliamentary landscape that has seen the growing prominence of the 
Sweden Democrats, a far-right party that taps into currents of xenophobia in the country by pushing 
for a halt to “mass immigration”. At the same time, it is worth noticing that the last labour immigration 
law, issued in 2008, was met with harsh opposition from the Social Democrats and trade unions, who 
accused the law of favouring exploitation and jeopardizing the rights of foreign workers.  
All this makes integration a highly prevalent theme in the Swedish political landscape. Issues of 
segregation, labour market inclusion and provisions for asylum seekers are particularly high on the 
agenda. These matters are crucial to understanding the underlying rationale of Swedish legislators’ 
recent policymaking in the area of migration and integration.  
Main actors 
The actual integration policy involves different institutional actors at national and local level. The 
main institution responsible for the management and implementation of integration policies is the 
Ministry of Employment. Within this agency, a key role is played by the Minister of Integration, who 
is directly in charge of integration matters, including: i) the incorporation of new arrivals into the 
labour market and into society as a whole; ii) the distribution of resources among municipalities for 
refugee reception; iii) naturalization procedures; iv) urban development. That said, all the different 
phases of the integration process are managed according to a model of multi-level governance in 
collaboration with several ministries and agencies: 
Table 4. Institutional actors dealing with integration at a national level  
Actor Tasks/Policy-areas 
Ministry of Integration 
 New arrivals 
 Resource distribution for refugee 
management 
 Naturalization procedure 
 Urban development  
Ministry of Justice (Swedish Migration Board) 
Migration policies (and related administrative 
matters) 
Police (reporting to the Ministry of Justice) Border control and return procedures 
Migration courts (Migrationsdomstolar) and Migration 
Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstol) 
 Citizenship acquisition  
 Asylum seekers admission  
 Return procedures 
County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelserna) Reception of unaccompanied minors 
Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) New arrivals  
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Table 4. Institutional actors dealing with integration at a national level (cont.) 
Actor Tasks/Policy-areas 
Swedish ESF Council (under the Ministry of Labour) 
Management of the Social Fund (Socialfonden) 
and the Integration Fund (Integrationsfonden). 
National Agency for Education (Skolverket). Education 
National Board on Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen). Health 
National Board of Housing, Building and Planning 
(Boverket). 
Housing and residential integration 
Embassies, consulates and diplomatic agencies Visa-issuing and related matters 
Their actions are complemented at the local level by the measures established by municipalities 
(kommuner), which contribute in several policy-areas: a) Refugee reception. Due to its voluntary 
nature, municipalities have taken on this task in an uneven fashion with serious problems concerning a 
shortage of places for unaccompanied children; b) Labour inclusion. Municipalities provide the civics 
element of the introduction plan, which is carried out with central state funding. However, since the 
Public Employment Agency took charge of the new introduction plans, their role in labour market 
integration has been diminished; c) Provision of Swedish language courses for immigrants (Svenska 
för invandrare or SFI) and other measures for educational inclusion (while the SFI courses are 
generally seen to bear results, incentives for student progress were removed since these did not show a 
marked increase in language performance); d) Support and guidance for housing; e) Specific actions 
and initiatives targeting youth and children.  
Main policy tools 
As stated by the Fact Sheet on Integration, published by the former Ministry of Integration and Gender 
Equality, the goal of Sweden’s integration policy is to “ensure equal rights, obligations and 
opportunities for all, irrespective of their ethnic and cultural background”(Regeringskansliet 2009: 1). 
Swedish integration policy has operated along the lines of an empowerment policy that has been 
generally applied to groups who suffer from social exclusion, discrimination and lack of opportunities. 
Public education, social welfare benefits, public health services, political participation, interest 
organizations and active labour market interventions were policies that developed during the course of 
building the welfare state (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003: 105-134). In effect, these same 
instruments have been employed for the purpose of immigrant integration; Swedish integration 
policies rely on the general welfare policies administered by the public sector to a greater extent than 
in any other European country (Bayram et al. 2009: 91). 
To this end, in 2008 the Government launched an integration strategy for the 2008-10 period, 
driven by seven main objectives: i) to ensure a faster introduction for new arrivals; ii) to create jobs 
and to stimulate entrepreneurship among foreigners; iii) to get better education results and to achieve 
greater equality in school; iv) to attain better language skills and to enhance adult education 
opportunities; v) to deploy effective anti-discrimination measures; vi) to enhance the urban 
development of districts and suburbs with extensive social exclusion; vii) to share and sustain common 
basic values. The labour market represents the main focus of Swedish policymakers in the area of 
integration. After the 2010 decision to speed up the integration of new arrivals, the Public 
Employment Agency was given the responsibility for coordinating introduction activities. The agency 
drew up an “introduction plan” to speed up social and labour market integration, as well as an 
“introduction guide” to help migrants in the first period after their arrival, which asks them to 
participate in a civic orientation. While participation in the introduction plan is not compulsory, a new 
benefit is paid to migrants who participate in introduction activities, regardless of where they have 
settled in Sweden. In addition, a set of different activities has been established to improve job 
placement for immigrants. 
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• The “nystartsjobb” (“new start jobs”) for newly arrived immigrants and the long-term 
unemployed, under which employers can obtain subventions for hiring foreigners. 
• The “prova-på-plats” (“try-place”), which represents a form of structured work experience. 
• Support to foreign entrepreneurs and business owners through mentorships, advice and 
networking. 
The labour-market focus of these activities is mirrored by official pre-departure initiatives. In this 
regard, the role played employers needs to be pointed out; since the last reform in 2008, employers are 
in charge of skills evaluation in the recruitment process abroad. Migrants’ barriers to international 
recruitment include the lack of information and language skills as well as a reliance on middlemen. To 
deal with these matters, the Migration Board is considering the implementation of new measures, 
including the improvement of its web portal and a search for partnerships with associations based in 
the countries of origin. 
As regards naturalization procedures, the Sweden system allows foreigners with a permanent 
residence permit, who have lived in the country for at least five years, to apply for Swedish 
citizenship. Unlike many other European countries, citizenship can be granted regardless of 
language/knowledge skills.  
Swedish for Immigrants (Svenska för invandrare or SFI), the national free Swedish language 
course offered to immigrants, represents a cornerstone of Sweden’s integration policy, although 
financial results-based incentives (the “SFI bonus”) have now been removed. Courses, provided by 
municipalities, are available to immigrants who are older than 16 and possess a residence permit and a 
Swedish national registration number. Daytime courses usually involve 15-20 hours a week of 
classroom time, and evening courses about 6 hours a week. Professional specializations are also 
available. 
A law on discrimination entered into force in 2009, and accordingly a new authority, the Equality 
Ombudsman, was created to ensure that law’s implementation.  
In the 2014 Budget, the government launched a new set of policy initiatives on integration.  
• Citizenship ceremonies offered in all municipalities in order to “use citizenship as a tool for 
integration”. 
• Tailored training programmes run by Swedish folkhögskolor (adult education 
establishments), which include language learning. 
• An extra fund for measures that fight against xenophobia and intolerance. 
• Increased state support for municipalities accepting new arrivals.  
4.2 Institutional and policy framework of emigration and diaspora policies of Iran and Turkey  
The INTERACT theoretical framework introduces a clear conceptual division between emigration and 
diaspora policies. Thus, emigration policies are conceived as “all policies that regulate (either 
facilitating or limiting) outward migration, mobility across countries and possible return” (Unterreiner 
and Weinar 2014: 12). These policies include bilateral agreements on labour mobility, agreements on 
the portability of rights or recognition of qualifications, pre-departure trainings, as well as visa 
facilitations and other legal measures facilitating (or preventing) cross-border mobility. The distinctive 
feature of such policies is that they do not focus on the permanent settlement of emigrants abroad. In 
contrast, diaspora policies are “policies that engage emigrants and members of diaspora communities 
(both organised communities and those comprised of individuals) with their countries of origin, 
building a sense of belonging and strengthening ties” (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014: 13). In this case, 
the definition is actor-driven, in the sense that the concrete set of measures and tools addressing the 
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diaspora community is strictly related to the practices implemented in their country of origin by both 
state and non-state actors. In this regard, it is worth noting that these policies have two dimensions: 
collective and individual. The former refers to measures targeting migrants and their descendents as a 
group (e.g. policies focusing on associations or community schools abroad), while the latter refers to 
measures targeting migrants as individuals (e.g. electoral law or access to nationality).  
Despite such distinctions, which concern two different periods of the migratory process, it is 
difficult to identify the concrete moment in which the “phase of emigration” finishes and the “stage of 
permanent settlement abroad” begins. It is worth noticing that emigration and diaspora policies tend to 
overlap if emigrants do not return to the origin country or settle abroad. 
Emigration policies 
In Iran, there is no single comprehensive legal act that specifically addresses emigration. It is only 
possible to find scattered legal norms and administrative regulations which govern different aspects of 
emigration. In general terms, the Iranian government has not encouraged emigration in the past and 
still does not. Its overriding concern is that of return migration; it provides support for the return of 
Iranian expatriates. As a result, the majority of Iranian refugees and those who have illegally exited the 
country can easily return by completing a series of administrative procedures and formalities at an 
Iranian embassy or consulate. That said, it is worth noting that one of the main objectives set by the 
Fourth and Fifth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plans was the adoption of measures to 
support the dispatch of the labour force abroad. To this end, a comprehensive and strategic legislation 
is currently under codification. In addition, in order to promote the employment of Iranians abroad and 
to further support the presence of Iranian experts in foreign markets, a tripartite memorandum was 
concluded in 2013 between the Ministry of Labour and Social welfare, the Trade Promotion 
Organisation of Iran and the Iranian Trade Association of International Recruitment Offices. 
In contrast, Turkish emigrants rely on an extensive network of actors and political measures which 
target their interests and needs. Turkey’s systematic approach towards emigration is gradually 
becoming more visible with the general expansion of emigrants’ political, civic, socio-economic and 
cultural rights. Still, it should be noted that this approach, and the related institutional and political 
framework, have undergone a complex transformation over the last decades; this began in the 1960s 
with the First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967), which manifested the clear intention of 
policymakers to export surplus labour power as a crucial tool for development. According to the same 
rationale, namely to reduce unemployment and increase remittances, bilateral labour agreements were 
signed with Sweden (1967) and with other Western countries. During this period, the two core 
institutions regulating the flows of labour migrants were the State Planning Organization (DPT) and 
the Turkish Employment Service (İİBK). Other relevant bodies included the Ministry of Labour and 
the Social Security Overseas Branch, the Coordination Committees on the Problems of Workers and 
Citizens Abroad, the Village Development Cooperatives and the State Industry and Workers’ 
Investment Bank (1975). The action of these bodies found implementation in three main legal 
measures pursuing economic growth and development: the First and the Second Five year 
Development Plans (respectively in force from 1963 to 1967 and from 1968 to 1973) and the Law on 
Housing and Artisan Loans and Lending Money to Workers Abroad (1964). Policies changed in the 
1980s, when Turkish permanent settlement in Europe was generally accepted and policymakers’ 
concerns shifted toward return migration and the integration of the Turkish diaspora abroad. Currently 
there is no functioning bilateral agreement on labour migration between Turkey and Sweden (in the 
sense of sending workers abroad). 
On the whole, the two countries of origin taken into account present two different institutional 
frameworks to deal with their respective emigrants: on the one hand, Turkey, which over time has 
established an active policy to address its emigrants, providing legal channels that favour outflow 
migration and grant emigrants rights abroad; and on the other hand, Iranian policymakers, who have 
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been reluctant emigration players, focusing more on the fight against political dissidents and on return 
migration. Such differences can be linked to different historical contexts and different migratory 
dynamics. Analogous differences, however, can be found in the domain of diaspora policies.  
Diaspora policies 
The Iranian government has not yet established a comprehensive and effective policy addressing its 
diaspora community, which is predominately comprised of people who left the country after the 1979 
revolution and the war with Iraq (1980-1989). However during the last decade, some efforts have been 
centred on the preservation of ties and connections with Iranians living abroad. In 2005, the High 
Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad was established, which represents the main and most important 
public body in Iran dealing with Iranian affairs abroad. Initially under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
it was transferred to the Office of the President during the first mandate of President Ahmadinejad; at 
that point its structure was enhanced. It now includes seven working groups dedicated to specific tasks 
(Consulate; Scientific and Education Cooperation; Economics and Trade; Media and Culture; Modern 
Science and Technology; Judicial and Legal; Religion and Opinion). Other relevant public institutions 
active in diaspora policies are the Parliamentary Faction in Support of Iranian Nationals Living 
Abroad and the Department of International Affairs & Schools Abroad, which belongs to the Ministry 
of Education (the latter is a body in charge of a hundred of Iranian schools abroad). 
More generally, it is the area of education, culture and identity perseveration in which is possible to 
find core actions targeting the diaspora community. The Fourth and the Fifth Development Plan 
stressed the promotion of Iranian and Islamic identities and the spread of the Persian language. In this 
regard, a crucial role is played by Iran’s National Elites Foundation, a governmental organization 
founded in 2005 by approval of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council of Iran, which aims to 
support the national talents of Iran’s elite, for instance by funding the travels and movements of 
Iranian elites abroad.  
As for political and social rights, Iranian expatriates have the right to vote in the presidential 
election and, since 2013, workers have been covered by a retirement plan in addition to disability 
insurance.
5
 This could be interpreted as another sign of increased openness towards emigrants settled 
abroad. Along the same line, the growing tolerance of dual nationality should be noted. Even if Iranian 
civil code does not formally recognize dual nationality and requires the repudiation of Iranian 
nationality as a pre-requisite for acquiring a foreign nationality, the public administration implicitly 
acknowledges dual nationality at the level of administrative practice; therefore, Iranian citizens are 
able to preserve their nationality while acquiring a foreign citizenship.  
That said, the actions of the Turkish government are more than a step ahead of the Iranian 
government. A first point to take into consideration is the existence of bilateral agreements on labour 
migration; Turkey has signed bilateral agreements on double taxation with 80 countries (with Sweden 
in 1967) and on social security with 28 countries (with Sweden in 1977), allowing the portability of 
social rights as well as health benefits for both emigrants visiting Turkey and retired emigrants who 
have returned to Turkey.  
An overview of the Turkish diaspora policy over time shows a move from a policy to promote 
return migration (1960s), to the maintenance of economic and social ties with emigrants (1970s), to 
the continued institutionalization of monitoring and control of Turkish populations overseas (1980s) 
and finally, to active state involvement in diaspora policies (1990s and 2000s). In the last two decades, 
Turkish governments have increased their engagement with emigrants and diaspora communities in 
host countries: legal and official incentives have been created, monitoring tools have been 
                                                     
5
 However, it seems that employees working abroad through individual channels, and not via official 
recruitment, are not yet covered by such a benefit. 
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implemented and a diversified set of political measures have been carried out to secure links and to 
improve their living conditions abroad. At present, there are three major institutions responsible for the 
creation and implementation of the diaspora policy: i) the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens 
Living Abroad, ii) the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, which searches and 
monitors the problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad, and iii) the Prime Ministry Presidency for 
Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, established in 2010, which is the decision maker in the area 
of diaspora policy. On the cultural front, the Ministry of Education has representation offices in 
several countries, including Sweden. Turkish language abroad is taught in line with the “Turkish 
Language and Culture Programme” which allows Turkish children abroad to benefit from elective 
Turkish classes in their schools.
6
 In addition, according to the decision taken by the Inter-Ministerial 
Common Culture Association (Bakanlıklararası Ortak Kültür Komisyonu), Turkish teachers and 
professors are sent to emigrants’ host countries. These teaching professionals usually find work in 
Turkish Culture Centres (linked to Embassies), in the Turkology Departments of universities or in 
European schools. As regards the education of Turkish children abroad, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs establishes the number of teaching staff to be sent abroad. Regarding legal services, the 
General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs is responsible for Blue Card procedures for 
Turkish nationals who have given up their Turkish citizenship but wish to benefit from rights similar 
to Turkish citizens. On the media front, the public television channel TRT broadcasts internationally 
and acts as a tool of communication between Turkey and its emigrants abroad.  
As regards the legal aspects of the diaspora policy, three developments deserve attention. The first 
one is the introduction of dual citizenship (1981) which, conceived as a practical tool of integration, 
significantly increased the number of Turkish citizens who obtained the citizenship of their host 
country. The second legal development is the inclusion of Turkish citizens abroad in the 1982 
Constitution.
7
 The third development refers to the aforementioned Blue Card procedure, which since 
1995 has granted political and social rights to migrants who terminated their Turkish citizenship in 
order to become citizens in their country of residence.  
Finally, Turkish emigrants who are 18 or older can vote in general elections, presidential elections 
and on referendums in Turkey. Turkish citizens (including dual citizens) can also stand in the 
elections. There are four different modalities by which an emigrant can cast a vote from abroad: by 
regular mail, at the borders, at consulates abroad, and electronically. At each election, the Turkish 
High Election Council announces the available vote-casting modalities according to the country and 
election. 
The differences between the states of origin that have been illustrated so far are reflected in the 
following table, which summarizes their respective systems of legal and political measures targeting 
emigrants and the diaspora. 
                                                     
6
 Turkish language is also taught at the Yunus Emre Institutes. None, however, have been established in Sweden. 
7
 Article 62 of the 1982 Constitution noted: “The Government takes measures to ensure the family unity of 
Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to 
provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their return”. 
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Table 5. State-level framework of emigration/diaspora policies: Iran vs. Turkey  
 Turkey Iran 
Legal framework for 
emigrants/diaspora 
Formal and organized structure No formal structure 
Approach towards 
emigrants 
Control, protection and empowerment of diaspora 
Indifference (feeble recognition of 
diaspora) 
Main state-actors 
Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and 
Relative Communities 
Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living 
Abroad  
High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living 
Abroad  




Blue Card  
Bilateral agreement on Social Security  
Retirement plan ensured in special 
cases 
Political rights 
Right to vote in presidential election, general 
election and on referendums 
Right to vote in general election 
Language and 
cultural rights 
Cultural programmes and language courses. 
Turkish teachers sent abroad 
Informal support for the 
preservation of the Islamic identity 
abroad.  
Dual citizenship  
Actively supported as a tool for integration 
abroad 
Formally forbidden, but 
increasingly tolerated informally  
5. Integration trends of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden8  
When discussing integration, the focus is centred on particular dimensions of the phenomenon, 
including the labour market, the educational context and citizenship-related issues. To deal with these 
dimensions, we use different statistical tools which range from simple indicators, traditionally 
employed in the literature, to more complex tools specifically developed for the INTERACT project; 
specifically, a synthetic index that relies on a specific set of indicators is elaborated for each 
dimension of integration: i) a Labour Market Integration Index, ii) an Education Integration Index and 
iii) a Citizenship Integration Index are calculated (see section on Methodology). The following table 
illustrates the results of these indexes for Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden. 
Table 6. The Integration Index in Sweden:  
a comparison between Iranian and Turkish immigrants 
 Iranian immigrants Turkish immigrants 
Labour Market Integration Index 0.59 0.51 
Education Integration Index 0.34 0.17 
Citizenship Integration Index 0.82 0.90 
Source: INTERACT team estimations (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015). 
The “scores” of these indexes give us a general idea about the level of integration of the immigrant 
groups examined. Considering different indexes altogether, the Iranian and Turkish communities show 
average levels of integration, with the former performing better than the latter (respectively 1.75 and 
1.58 points out of 3 points available, which is the sum of the three indexes). However, by taking each 
                                                     
8
 This section relies on the information and findings provided by Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti 
(2015). Further details concerning the statistical analysis and integration indexes can be found in their 
Research Report. 
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index into account individually, it is possible to have a more precise idea about the integration of these 
groups.  
Figure 5. Integration trends of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden, Synthetic Indexes 
 
 Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
As shown in the table, Iranians show a higher level of integration than Turkish immigrants as regards 
the labour market (0.59 and 0.51) and an even greater difference as regards the educational context 
(0.34 and 0.17), whereas the latter perform better in terms of access to Swedish citizenship (0.90 and 
0.82). Overall, it is worth noting a similarity between these immigrant groups regarding their 
respective trend of integration: on the one hand, both show a high tendency to acquire the nationality 
of their country of destination – which is generally believed to be an important factor of immigrant 
integration – and on the other, they show poor results in education, which on the contrary, illustrates 
considerable difficulties with the integration process.  
Opposite trends include the labour market’s score in which, once again, the groups present 
interesting similarities with outcomes barely higher than the average threshold. Hereinafter, in order to 
get a clearer picture of each dimension of integration examined, some specific statistical indicators are 
taken into account. With the same aim, relevant information about the native population is also 
included.  
As regards labour market indicators, Iranian and Turkish immigrants present analogous results, in 
particular when we consider respective shares of people categorized according to their economic 
status. Their active labour forces are similar to each other, equal to 65% and the 62% of their 
respective populations, which is even comparable to natives’ (63%). Even the labour force 
compositions are comparable for these groups, with similar shares of employed and employed people.  
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Figure 6. Labour market integration of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden  
 
Source: Statistics Sweden; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
Yet, it is the latter that raises more concern in terms of integration; in this case the difference with the 
native population is significant: the unemployment rate is 15.4% for Turkish immigrants in Sweden 
and 15.6% for Iranians, but approximately 4.3% for the native population.  
As regards job characteristics, it is interesting to note that the great majority of these immigrant 
communities are employed in the service sector. 
Table 7. Labour market integration: Employment Type and Sector 







Share of self-employment 0.067 0.103 0.063 
Share of employees 0.933 0.897 0.937 
Share employed in agriculture 0.000 0.000 0.020 
Share employed in manufacturing 0.100 0.009 0.210 
Share employed in services 0.900 0.910 0.770 
 Source: Statistics Sweden; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
A notable difference concerns the nature of employment. While both the majorities of these groups are 
employed in relatively low-skilled occupations (employees with occupation ISCO from 4 to 9), their 
shares differ considerably: 80% of Turkish immigrants and 55% of Iranians fall into this category. 
This means that 45% of the latter are employed in high-skilled occupations (employees with 
occupation ISCO from 1 to 3), which is a score comparable to that of natives (46%). 
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Figure 7. Labour market integration: Occupation categories 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
 
This feature of high-qualifications which characterizes the collective of Iranian-born immigrants is 
mirrored in the data that relates to the educational context: one third is tertiary-educated. This is a 
notable fact given that it is a much higher share than among natives, where the number of tertiary-
educated is equal to 18%. As regards Turkish immigrants, this figure is halved (9%).  
Such a difference concerning the educational profile of Iranian and Turkish immigrants is confirmed 
by the data on the number of international students from these countries: between 2005 and 2012, 
approximately 1,125 students born in Iran came to Sweden every year to follow a course of study. The 
same figure is reduced to 281 international students for those born in Turkey.  
These immigrants groups are also different from each other with regard to fields of study. Iranians 
have been educated primarily in technical studies fields (40%), and Turkish immigrants in humanities 
(43%). The following table provides more detail about the categorizations of these groups according to 
the type of study followed.  
Table 8. Integration into the education context: fields of study 







Share with education in Humanities 0.23 0.43 0.45 
Share with education in Social Sciences 0.08 0.09 0.15 
Share with education in Technical Studies 0.40 0.14 0.24 
Share with education in Health-related Studies 0.03 0.01 0.13 
Source: Statistics Sweden; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
The last dimension of integration taken into account regards access to nationality, which can be 
viewed as an important factor of immigrant integration into the host country. In this respect, as pointed 
out by the scores in the aforementioned Citizenship Integration Index, Iranian and Turkish people 
living in Sweden appear highly integrated, with nearly 1,700 Swedish passports given every year, on 
average,
9
 to each group.  
                                                     
9 
Data source: Edu-Citizenship Statistics, 2008-2012.  
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However, despite similar trends regarding access to the nationality of the host country, these Iranian 
and Turkish immigrants can be distinguished between each other according to the type of residence 
permit held.  
Figure 8. Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden:  
a categorization according to the residence permit held 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In the light of the figures, the overall scenario of integration appears tangled and complex for the 
immigrant groups taken into account. If we consider the citizenship dimension, both seem 
significantly prone to being integrated into the host society. However, the scores concerning education 
and the labour market highlight significant difficulties. The high rates of unemployment point out 
significant barriers to becoming integrated into the domestic labour market. As regards the educational 
context, the situation is even more critical, and the score of the integration index is emblematic in this 
sense: Iranian-born immigrants have significant problems integrating into the host country’s 
educational context; this is even more the case for those born in Turkey.  
Why is this so? How can this be in Sweden, a country known for its “openness” to immigrants and 
being at the forefront in the area of integration policies? And, more generally, how is possible to 
explain the integration process of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden? 
The next section tries to answer these questions, focusing on the complex network of ties between 
institutional actors belonging to the destination country and to the country of origin, paying special 
attention to the role played by the latter, which has been labelled “the origin effect”.  
6. Explanatory factors of such integration’s trends 
The picture below attempts to sketch the network of institutional ties between destination and origin 
countries for the immigrant groups that are included in this report. The differences are obvious and 
clear-cut. Turkish migrants are able to rely on an extensive network that involves several actors within 
their country of origin, which pertain to both the state as well as to civil society. Their actions are 
complemented by those of other actors in the country of destination, to which the country of origin is 
often linked by agreements and practices. In contrast, Iranian migrants rely on a network with fewer 
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Despite these differences, both immigrant groups are able to count on a large network of associations 
and organizations operating in both Sweden and the origin countries. Yet, if on the one hand 
associations targeting Turkish emigrants in Sweden work in line with the Ankara government, those 
addressing Iranians abroad tend to operate precisely in opposition to the central government. 
Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly (2012) have estimated that there are approximately 125-130 Iranian-
focused organizations throughout Sweden, mostly based in Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö and 
Uppsala. According to Kelly (2011), these organizations aim to meet the social, cultural and political 
needs of their members. When they started to develop their own associations nearly a decade after 
their arrival, Iranian emigrants did so largely along political lines, so that many were set up as 
“cultural” associations, despite their political activities. Many others were created purely for social or 
for philanthropic reasons. According to key-informants, Iranian associations that are currently active 
in Sweden deal with many dimensions of integration, especially concerning the labour market, 
education and language. These associations encourage bonding between Iranians in the diaspora, and 
make it possible for Iranians to keep their ties to Iran through charitable works (i.e. by making 
donations to Iranian societies, raising awareness of social issues in Iran) without being overtly 
political. Their scope, rather than being limited to the Iranian community, is extended to other foreign-
born communities and often to Swedish natives as well, according to a conception of integration as a 
mutual process of adaptation (Moghadam 2014). Another important dimension in terms of integration, 
which is strictly related to the actions of immigrant associations, is represented by cultural events 
related to Iranian traditions such as: Eldfest, Melagan, Yalda, Caharsanba-sur and Nowruz. These 
events represent important occasions for Iranian immigrants to get acquainted and to reinforce 
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community ties in the host country. At the same time they give Iranians the opportunity to share 
aspects of their culture within the host society. In this regard it is worth mentioning the Persian New 
Year, which brings together many Iranians from different ethnic backgrounds in Sweden’s public 
parks and squares. Such demonstrations of culture and identity seem to be taking on more importance 
with time, as Iranians have slowly built up the resources and support to mobilize their cause (Kelly 
2011 and 2013).  
As regards Turkish associations, emigrant solidarity networks based in host countries have been the 
most visible non-state actors engaged in emigrant-centred activities. Since the mass migration flows of 
the 1960s, Turkish emigrants have established non-governmental organizations that aim to create 
solidarity among Turkish expatriates by serving origin towns or villages through provision of services. 
Today, the first task of emigrant solidarity associations is creating a channel of information among 
Turkish immigrants in the destination country and between the origin area and people living abroad. 
Websites established by solidarity networks include news from a town’s people, business 
advertisements and calls for business partnerships; on the whole, they merge homeland news with 
news from abroad under the same roof. These non-governmental organizations perform two other 
important tasks: they create solidarity ties in the destination country and provide a wide range of 
services for their hometown, such as organizing campaigns for low-income families, providing 
wheelchairs for disabled people or building libraries for schools and mosques. Activities such as these 
are organized in cooperation with the local government in Turkey. In particular, one of the main 
important actors is the Swedish-Turkish National Association (STRF) (Svensk-Turkiska 
Riksförbudet). Established in 2003, this association includes 15 different entities from nine cities 
(Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg, Varberg, Norrköping, Västerås, Eskilstuna, Linköping and 
Jönköping) and counts around 3,800 members. Its focus is on Turkish integration into Sweden as well 
as on the development and promotion of Turkish culture. The Assyrian Federation in Sweden 
(Assyriska Riksförbundet i Sverige) should also be mentioned. It groups together 28 different 
associations that work to support the integration and inclusion of Assyrian people (many of whom are 
immigrants coming from Turkey). This association actively works to represent Swedish-Assyrian 
interests, to increase awareness and recognition of the genocide of Assyrians and to support the 
democratic aspirations of Assyria. 
The goal of Turkish emigrant-solidarity associations – to provide services to both the emigrants in 
the host country and to people in their hometowns – fits well with Turkey’s aims for diaspora 
engagement. The official aim is to maintain and strengthen ties between Turkish emigrants and the 
state. The social and economic integration of emigrants in the host countries is considered crucial and 
cultural linkages are understood to be the core of the relationship between emigrants and the home 
country. In this context, the activities of solidarity associations are in line with the aims of state actors 
because they keep cultural linkages alive (by creating awareness about responsibilities towards one’s 
hometown) and favour integration in the host country (through a wide range of activities from 
language courses to counselling services) (Karci Korfali 2014).
10
 
On the basis of these premises, it is possible to envisage some lines of interpretation in order to 
understand the Index scores and, more generally, to clarify the integration dynamics of Iranian and 
Turkish immigrants in Sweden. For clarity of explanation, the subsequent analysis will be divided 
according to the index’s dimensions: citizenship, work and education. Finally, some concluding 
remarks concerning the “origin effect” are provided.  
Citizenship 
According to the citizenship index scores, both groups appear highly integrated with regard to the 
nationality dimension: every year, on average, 1,700 Swedish passports are given to people born in 
                                                     
10
 There is no data on whether emigrant solidarity associations receive funding from the Turkish state. 
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Iran and to those born in Turkey. Based on the evidence provided by qualitative surveys, it is 
reasonable to assume that states of origin have a significant “origin effect”. As regards Turkish 
immigrants, the Dual Citizenship Law (1981) and new policy goals pursued by policymakers in the 
last decades have had a positive impact on the naturalization process. It is also possible to speak of an 
“origin effect” with regard to Iranians, even if it follows a different logic. Most emigrants who left the 
country in the 1980s, as well as in recent years, did so in order to escape from the Islamic regimes that 
were brought in with the 1979 Revolution. In these cases, the decision to acquire Swedish nationality 
represents a rupture with the past and with the origin state. This difference concerning the nature and 
logic of the “origin effect” is confirmed by data regarding onward migration: both Turkish and Iranian 
immigrants present high rates of onward migration. However while the former tend to return to their 
home country, the latter are inclined to move onward to other Western countries (Klinthäll 2006, Kelly 
2013).  
Labour market  
Despite average scores for both groups with regard to the labour market integration index, the 
unemployment rates are especially worrying: 15.4% and 15.6%, respectively, for Turkish and Iranian 
immigrants. A figure that is even more critical to look at is the unemployment rate for Swedish 
natives: about 4.3% in 2014. Given the scarcity of data and information, it is difficult to estimate an 
“origin effect” as regards integration in the labour market. However according to the literature, it is 
possible to point out different potential drivers of integration for the groups examined. As regards 
Turkish immigrants, it is reasonable to assume a lack of human capital due to the low level of 
education that characterizes the majority of them. The same cannot be said for Iranians who, on the 
contrary, represent the foreign-born community with the highest share of tertiary-educated (even 
higher than Swedish natives). As pointed out by Kelly (2013), an individual factor related to status can 
come into play in this case. Following the author’s explanation, it is reasonable to think that many of 
the tertiary-educated Iranians living in Sweden prefer to take advantage of benefits granted by the 
Swedish welfare system than accept low-skilled jobs.  
Education  
As regards the educational context, integration problems are even more pronounced than in the labour 
market, in particular in relation to Turkish immigrants. The difference between Index scores – 0.34 for 
Iranians and 0.17 for Turkish immigrants – might be explained on the basis of the aforementioned 
difference in educational levels. Also in this case, it is hard to identify an “origin effect”, 
notwithstanding the fact that a lack of agreement between the countries of origin and destination 
regarding the recognition of educational qualifications surely represents an important barrier for the 
integration of both immigrant groups. In this regard, an important remark is needed: the Education 
Integration Index – as with other synthetic indexes elaborated – is sensitive to underlying indicators 
and to the selectivity of the migrant group considered. Iranians in Sweden, for instance represent one 
of the more educated groups among foreigners, but score low on this Index. This fact is related to their 
historical migratory profile, which is essentially comprised of family migrants and political refugees.  
On the whole, given the scarcity of data and the difficulty of finding relevant information in the 
literature, it is difficult to come up with a clear picture concerning the “origin effect” in this corridor. 
The result of such an effect is ambiguous and strictly related to the actors involved, the relations 
among them and the historic migratory profile. As regards Iranian immigrants, if on the one hand civil 
society organizations represent a positive factor, on the other hand the central government represents a 
concrete obstacle for integration in the host country (as pointed out by qualitative surveys). In-depth 
interviews highlight the “obstructionist” approach followed by the Teheran government, which seems 
to take advantage of difficulties experienced by Iranians residing in Sweden in order to instigate 
nationalistic sentiments. In this sense, two competing identity-building processes seem to clash over 
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the Iranian diaspora community in Sweden: on the one hand the religious and nationalistic process 
supported by the Iranian government, and on the other a secular and “more open” process fomented by 
immigrant associations that are active in Sweden. Such centripetal forces seem to have opposite 
effects in terms of the integration of Iranians. The Turkish case is different, and is characterized by a 
substantial merging of central administration and organizational interests: both of which aim to 
promote integration in the countries of destination and strengthen ties with the diaspora community. 
Still, even in this case, it is difficult to identify an actual “origin effect”. As highlighted by the 
literature, the policy framework issued by the Turkish government on the one hand favours the socio-
economic integration of emigrants into the host society, but on the other, sustains a conservative 
position on the defence of Turkish culture and language abroad (Bilgili and Siegel 2011).  
7. Conclusions 
The present report has investigated the process of integration of Iranian and Turkish immigrant 
communities in Sweden in comparative terms. As highlighted by the statistical indexes and indicators 
considered, both communities present relevant difficulties in terms of integration (especially as 
regards the labour market and the educational context). Notwithstanding the importance of migrants’ 
individual characteristics, this represents a puzzling outcome for Sweden, which is acknowledged as 
one of the most tolerant and open countries with respect to policymaking in the area of integration. 
The theoretical approach undertaken points out that the “origin effect” constitutes a crucial dimension 
for understanding the integration process and integration outcomes. Despite the exploratory nature of 
this study, which prevents us from offering an accurate and comprehensive analysis of such an effect, 
interesting insights about the actors and relationships involved have emerged. In particular, these 
include: a) the historic emigration profile of the origin country; b) the number and typology of actors 
at origin which are involved in the integration process of emigrants abroad; and c) the mutual 
relationships between these actors and with actors at destination. Furthermore, it is possible to identify 
five sub-relationships which seem to play a significant role in determining the magnitude and direction 
of the overall “origin effect”. These are: 1) the relationship between state-actors at origin and the 
diaspora community at destination; 2) the relationship between state-actors at origin and at destination; 
3) the relationship between state-actors at origin and non-state actors at destination; 4) the relationship 
between state-actors and non-state actors at origin; 5) the relationship between state-actors at origin 
and non-state actors at destination. 
Thus, Iranian and Turkish immigrant communities represent two opposite and paradigmatic cases 
in so far as they depict two different configurations of actors and relationships, which allow us to 
grasp the complex nature of the “origin effect”. These elements are sketched in the following table. 
Francesco Pasetti 
30 INTERACT RR2015/04 
Table 9. The origin effect: actors and their relationships 
 Iran Turkey 
Historic emigration profile 
Refugees (and family 
migrants) 
Labour migrants (and family 
migrants) 
Actors involved 
Few state-actors at origin 
Few non-state actors at origin 
Several non-state actors at 
destination 
Several state-actors at origin 
Several non-state actors at origin 
Several non-state actors at 
destination 
Relationships between actors   
1. Origin state-actors / Diaspora 
community  
Discordance Concordance 
2. Origin state-actors / Destination 
state-actors 
Discordance Concordance 
3. Origin state-actors / Origin non-
state actors 
Discordance Concordance 
4. Origin state-actors / Destination 
non-state actors 
Discordance Concordance 
5. Origin non-state-actors / 
Destination non-state actors 
Concordance Concordance 
The Turkish diaspora community relies on a network of state and non-state actors active in both 
Sweden and Turkey, who share interests and coordinate actions concerning emigrants’ integration. On 
the contrary, Iranian emigrants can only rely on civil society associations which are active at their 
destination, and which work and pursue goals in opposition to the Tehran government. Despite 
different configurations of actors and relationships, the reciprocal dynamics of interactions among the 
actors involved can lead to analogous effects in terms of integration. Thus, for instance, a convergent 
attitude on dual nationality between the governments of Stockholm and Ankara, backed by 
information and the support of civil society, could be conceived as an additional driver underlying the 
high rate of naturalization among Turks living in Sweden. On the other hand, the similar naturalization 
rates among Iranians could be related to the historical profile of emigrants (who tend to leave the 
country in opposition to the central government) in conjunction with the support of NGOs, which tend 
to favour the integration of the target community at destination (in contrast with the state-actors at 
origin). 
To reframe integration as a three-way process expands the analytical perspective and allows us to 
consider actors, relationships and dynamics that have been paid scant attention to date. The “origin 
effect” also adds a degree of complexity to the analysis of immigrants’ integration process in host 
countries and, at the same time, presents itself as an unavoidable dimension of analysis for future 
research in this area. 
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